Abstract. We present new probabilistic generalizations of Pearl's entailment in System Z and Lehmann's lexicographic entailment, called z λ -and lex λ -entailment, which are parameterized through a value λ ∈ [0, 1] that describes the strength of the inheritance of purely probabilistic knowledge. In the special cases of λ = 0 and λ = 1, the notions of z λ -and lex λ -entailment coincide with probabilistic generalizations of Pearl's entailment in System Z and Lehmann's lexicographic entailment that have been recently introduced by the author. We show that the notions of z λ -and lex λ -entailment have similar properties as their classical counterparts. In particular, they both satisfy the rationality postulates of System P and the property of Rational Monotonicity. Moreover, z λ -entailment is weaker than lex λ -entailment, and both z λ -and lex λ -entailment are proper generalizations of their classical counterparts.
INTRODUCTION
During the recent decades, there is a significant amount of research in AI that focuses on probabilistic reasoning with interval restrictions for conditional probabilities, also called conditional constraints (Lukasiewicz 1999b) .
For example, suppose that we have the knowledge "ostriches are birds", "birds have legs", "birds fly with a probability of at least 0.95", and "ostriches fly with a probability of at most 0.05". What do we then conclude about the property of having legs of birds (resp., ostriches) and their ability to fly?
One important approach for handling conditional constraints is modeltheoretic probabilistic logic, which can be traced back to Boole (1854) . There is a wide spectrum of formal languages that have been explored in model-theoretic probabilistic logic, ranging from constraints for unconditional and conditional events (e.g., Amarger et al. 1991; Frisch and Haddawy 1994; Lukasiewicz 1999a Lukasiewicz ,b, 2001b Nilsson 1986 ) to rich languages that specify linear inequalities over events (Fagin et al. 1990 ). The main algorithmic tasks in model-theoretic probabilistic logic are deciding satisfiability and logical consequence, and computing tight logically entailed intervals.
For example, in model-theoretic probabilistic logic, we conclude from the above knowledge that both birds and ostriches have legs, and that birds (resp., ostriches) fly with a probability of at least 0.95 (resp., at most 0.05).
Another important approach to probabilistic reasoning with conditional constraints is based on the coherence principle of de Finetti and generalizations of it (e.g., Biazzo and Gilio 2000; Coletti and Scozzafava 1999; Gilio 1995 Gilio , 2002 . The main tasks are checking the consistency of a probabilistic assessment, and propagating a given assessment to further conditional events.
For example, in coherence-based probabilistic logic, we conclude from the above knowledge that birds (resp., ostriches) have (resp., do not have) legs, and that they fly with a probability of at least 0.95 (resp., at most 0.05).
The relationship between model-theoretic and coherence-based probabilistic logic has recently been explored in (Biazzo et al. 2002) . In particular, it turned out that entailment under coherence is strictly weaker than model-theoretic entailment, while consistency in probabilistic logic under coherence is strictly stronger than satisfiability in model-theoretic probabilistic logic. Furthermore, it has been shown that probabilistic entailment under coherence is a generalization of classical default entailment in System P, while model-theoretic probabilistic entailment is well-known to be a generalization of model-theoretic entailment in classical propositional logics.
Recently, the author (2002a,b) has shown that other formalisms for default reasoning from conditional knowledge bases can be extended to the probabilistic framework of conditional constraints, to overcome some serious drawbacks of model-theoretic and coherence-based probabilistic logic.
The literature contains several different proposals for default reasoning from conditional knowledge bases and extensive work on its desired properties. The core of these properties are the rationality postulates of System P proposed by Kraus et al. (1990) . It turned out that these rationality postulates constitute a sound and complete axiom system for several classical model-theoretic entailment relations under uncertainty measures on worlds. In detail, they characterize classical model-theoretic entailment under preferential structures (Shoham, 1987; Kraus et al. 1990 ), infinitesimal probabilities (Adams, 1975; Pearl, 1989) , possibility measures , and world rankings. They also characterize an entailment relation based on conditional objects (Dubois and Prade, 1994) . A survey of the above relationships is given in (Benferhat et al. 1997 ).
Mainly to solve problems with irrelevant information, the notion of rational closure as a more adventurous notion of entailment was introduced by Lehmann (1989) . It is equivalent to entailment in System Z by Pearl (1990) , to the least specific possibility entailment by Benferhat et al. (1992) , and to a conditional (modal) logic-based entailment by Lamarre (1992) . Finally, mainly to solve problems with property inheritance from classes to exceptional subclasses, further formalisms were proposed, among which there is lexicographic entailment by Lehmann (1995) and Benferhat et al. (1993) .
The main aspects of the probabilistic generalizations of default reasoning formalisms in (Lukasiewicz 2002a,b) are summarized as follows:
• The work (2002a) introduces probabilistic generalizations of Pearl's entailment in System Z (1990) and Lehmann's lexicographic entailment (1995) , which lie between model-theoretic probabilistic entailment and probabilistic entailment under coherence. That is, the new notions of entailment generalize their classical counterparts, they are stronger than entailment under coherence, and weaker than model-theoretic entailment. Roughly, the main difference between model-theoretic probabilistic entailment and probabilistic entailment under coherence is that the former realizes an inheritance of logical knowledge, while the latter does not. Intuitively, the new formalisms now add a strategy for resolving inconsistencies to model-theoretic entailment, and a restricted form of inheritance of logical knowledge to entailment under coherence. This is why the new notions of entailment are weaker than entailment in model-theoretic probabilistic logic and stronger than entailment in coherence-based probabilistic logic. The new formalisms can especially be used in place of model-theoretic probabilistic entailment when one wants to resolve inconsistencies related to conditioning on zero events.
• The companion paper (2002b) presents similar probabilistic generalizations of Pearl's entailment in System Z and Lehmann's lexicographic entailment. The formalisms in (2002b), however, behave quite differently from the ones in (2002a). Roughly, entailment in model-theoretic probabilistic logic realizes some inheritance of logical knowledge, but no inheritance of purely probabilistic knowledge.
The new formalisms in (2002b) now add an inheritance of purely probabilistic knowledge and a strategy for resolving inconsistencies (due to the inheritance of logical and purely probabilistic knowledge) to entailment in model-theoretic probabilistic logic. This is why they are generally much stronger than entailment in model-theoretic probabilistic logic. Thus, they are especially useful where the notion of model-theoretic entailment is too weak, for example, in probabilistic logic programming (Lukasiewicz 2001b,a) . Other applications are deriving degrees of belief from statistical knowledge and degrees of belief, handling inconsistencies in probabilistic knowledge bases, and probabilistic belief revision.
In the present paper, we now define a general approach to nonmonotonic probabilistic reasoning, which subsumes the above two approaches (2002a) and (2002b) as special cases. Roughly, the main idea behind this new approach is to add to logical (resp., g-coherent) entailment (i) some inheritance of purely probabilistic (resp., logical and purely probabilistic) knowledge, where the inheritance of purely probabilistic knowledge is controlled by a strength λ ∈ [0, 1], and (ii) a mechanism for resolving inconsistencies due to the inheritance of logical and purely probabilistic knowledge.
The main contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows:
• We present new probabilistic generalizations of Pearl's entailment in System Z (1990) and Lehmann's lexicographic entailment (1995) , which are parameterized through a value λ ∈ [0, 1] that describes the strength of the inheritance of purely probabilistic knowledge. In the special case of λ = 0 (resp., λ = 1), these new formalisms coincide with the formalisms introduced by the author in (2002a) (resp., (2002b)).
• We show that the new probabilistic formalisms of strength λ have similar properties as their classical counterparts. In particular, they both satisfy the rationality postulates of System P and the property of Rational Monotonicity. Moreover, entailment in System Z of strength λ is weaker than lexicographic entailment of strength λ.
• We show that the notions of entailment in System Z of strength λ and of lexicographic entailment of strength λ are proper generalizations of their classical counterparts. Moreover, they are weaker than some notion of logical entailment in model-theoretic probabilistic logic, and under certain conditions they coincide with this notion of entailment.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives some technical preliminaries, and recalls basic concepts from model-theoretic and coherence-based probabilistic logic. In Section 3, we introduce the new notions of entailment in System Z of strength λ, and of lexicographic entailment of strength λ. Section 4 explores some general properties of the new formalisms. Section 5 summarizes the main results and gives an outlook on future research. Detailed proofs of all results are given in (Lukasiewicz, 2003) .
PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we first recall probabilistic knowledge bases. We then recall the notions of satisfiability and of logical entailment from model-theoretic probabilistic logic, and the notions of g-coherence and of g-coherent entailment from probabilistic logic under coherence.
Probabilistic Knowledge Bases
We now recall the concept of a probabilistic knowledge base. We start by defining logical constraints and probabilistic formulas, which are interpreted by probability distributions over a set of possible worlds.
We assume a set of basic events = {p 1 , . . . , p n } with n ≥ 1. We use ⊥ and to denote false and true, respectively. We define events by induction as follows. Every element of ∪ {⊥, } is an event. If φ and ψ are events, then also ¬φ and (φ ∧ ψ). A conditional event is an expression of the form ψ|φ with events ψ and φ. A conditional constraint is an expression of the form (ψ|φ) [l, u] with events ψ, φ, and real numbers l, u ∈ [0, 1]. We define probabilistic formulas by induction as follows. Every conditional constraint is a probabilistic formula. If F and G are probabilistic formulas, then also ¬F and (F ∧ G). We use (F ∨ G) and (F ⇐ G) to abbreviate ¬(¬F ∧ ¬G) and ¬(¬F ∧ G), respectively, where F and G are either two events or two probabilistic formulas, and adopt the usual conventions to eliminate parentheses. A logical constraint is an event of the form ψ ⇐ φ.
A world I is a truth assignment to the basic events in (that is, a mapping I : → {true, false}), which is inductively extended to all events by I (⊥) = false, I ( )=true, I (¬φ)=true iff I (φ)=false, and I ((φ∧ψ)) = true iff I (φ) = I (ψ) = true. We use I to denote the set of all worlds for . A world I satisfies an event φ, or I is a model of φ, denoted I | φ, iff I (φ) = true. We extend worlds I to conditional events ψ|φ by I (ψ|φ)=true iff I | ψ ∧ φ, I (ψ|φ)=false iff I | ¬ψ ∧ φ, and I (ψ|φ)=indeterminate iff I | ¬φ. A probabilistic interpretation Pr is a probability function on I (that is, a mapping Pr : I → [0, 1] such that all Pr(I ) with I ∈ I sum up to 1). The probability of an event φ in the probabilistic interpretation Pr, denoted Pr(φ), is the sum of all Pr(I ) such that I ∈ I and I | φ. For events φ and ψ with Pr(φ) > 0, we write Pr(ψ|φ) to abbreviate Pr(ψ ∧ φ) / Pr(φ). The truth of logical constraints and probabilistic formulas F in a probabilistic interpretation Pr, denoted Pr | F, is defined as follows:
We say Pr satisfies F, or Pr is a model of F, iff Pr | F. We say Pr satisfies a set of logical constraints and probabilistic formulas F, or Pr is a model of F, denoted Pr | F, iff Pr is a model of all F ∈ F.
A probabilistic knowledge base KB = (L , P) consists of a finite set of logical constraints L and a finite set of conditional constraints P such that (i) l ≤ u for all (ψ|φ) [l, u] ∈ P, and (ii) ψ 1 |φ 1 = ψ 2 |φ 2 for any two dis-
The following example illustrates the syntactic notion of a probabilistic knowledge base. EXAMPLE 2.1 The knowledge "ostriches are birds", "birds have legs", "birds fly with a probability of at least 0.95", and "ostriches fly with a probability of at most 0.05" in our introductory example can be expressed by the probabilistic knowledge base KB = (L , P), where L = {bird ⇐ ostrich} and
Model-Theoretic Probabilistic Logic
We now recall the model-theoretic notions of satisfiability and of logical entailment for probabilistic knowledge bases.
A set of logical constraints and probabilistic formulas F is satisfiable iff a model of F exists. A conditional constraint (ψ|φ) [l, u] is a logical consequence of F, denoted F || (ψ|φ) [l, u] , iff each model of F is also a model of (ψ|φ) [l, u] . We say (ψ|φ) [l, u] is a tight logical consequence of F, denoted F || tight (ψ|φ) [l, u] , iff l (resp., u) is the infimum (resp., supremum) of Pr(ψ|φ) subject to all models Pr of F with Pr(φ) > 0. Here, we define l = 1 and u = 0, when F || (φ| ) [0, 0] . [l, u] . We give an example to illustrate the above concepts. EXAMPLE 2.2 Consider again the probabilistic knowledge base KB = (L , P) of Example 2.1. In model-theoretic probabilistic logic, KB represents the logical knowledge "all ostriches are birds" and "all birds have legs" (that is, in model-theoretic probabilistic logic, a logical constraint ψ ⇐ φ ∈ L has the same meaning as a conditional constraint (ψ|φ)[1, 1] ∈ P), and the probabilistic knowledge "birds fly with a probability of at least 0.95" and "ostriches fly with a probability of at most 0.05". It is not difficult to see that KB is satisfiable, and that (legs|bird) [ 
Probabilistic Logic Under Coherence
We now recall the notions of g-coherence and of g-coherent entailment. We define them by using some characterizations through concepts from default reasoning (Biazzo et al. 2002) . We first give some preparative definitions.
A probabilistic interpretation Pr verifies a conditional constraint (ψ|φ) [l, u] iff Pr(φ) > 0 and Pr | (ψ|φ) [l, u] . We say Pr falsifies (ψ|φ) [l, u] iff Pr(φ) > 0 and Pr | (ψ|φ) [l, u] . A set of conditional constraints P tolerates a conditional constraint (ψ|φ) [l, u] under a set of logical constraints L iff L ∪ P has a model that verifies (ψ|φ) [l, u] . We say P is under L in conflict with (ψ|φ) [l, u] iff no model of L ∪ P verifies (ψ|φ) [l, u] .
A conditional constraint ranking σ on a probabilistic knowledge base KB = (L , P) maps each element of P to a nonnegative integer. It is admissible with KB iff every P ⊆ P that is under L in conflict with some C ∈ P contains a conditional constraint C such that σ (C ) < σ (C).
We are now ready to define the concept of g-coherence for KB. A probabilistic knowledge base KB is g-coherent iff there exists a conditional constraint ranking on KB that is admissible with KB.
We next define the notion of g-coherent entailment. Let KB = (L , P) be a g-coherent probabilistic knowledge base, and let (ψ|φ) [l, u] [l, u] , iff l (resp., u) is the infimum (resp., supremum) of p subject to all g-coherent (L , P ∪ {(ψ|φ) [ p, p] 
}).
The following example illustrates the notions of g-coherence and g-coherent entailment. EXAMPLE 2.3 Consider again the probabilistic knowledge base KB = (L , P) of Example 2.1. In probabilistic logic under coherence, KB represents the logical knowledge "all ostriches are birds", the default logical knowledge "generally, birds have legs" (that is, in probabilistic logic under coherence, a logical constraint ψ ⇐ φ ∈ L does not have the same meaning as a conditional constraint (ψ|φ)[1, 1] ∈ P), and the default probabilistic knowledge "generally, birds fly with a probability of at least 0.95" and "generally, ostriches fly with a probability of at most 0.05".
It is not difficult to see that KB is g-coherent, and that (legs|bird) [ 
NONMONOTONIC PROBABILISTIC LOGICS
In this section, we introduce new probabilistic generalizations of Pearl's entailment in System Z and Lehmann's lexicographic entailment. The new probabilistic formalisms are parameterized through a value λ ∈ [0, 1] that describes the strength of the inheritance of purely probabilistic knowledge.
We first describe the main ideas behind the new formalisms, we then define the concept of λ-consistency for probabilistic knowledge bases, and we finally introduce the new notions of z λ -and lex λ -entailment.
Key Ideas
The property of inheritance of knowledge along subclass relationships can be divided into the properties of inheritance of logical knowledge and of inheritance of purely probabilistic knowledge. The inheritance of logical knowledge (L-INH) is the following property (for all events ψ, φ, and φ , all probabilistic knowledge bases KB, and all c ∈ {0, 1}):
L-INH. If KB ∼ (ψ|φ)[c, c] and φ ⇐ φ is valid, then KB ∼ (ψ|φ )[c, c].
The inheritance of purely probabilistic knowledge (P-INH) is defined as follows (for all events ψ, φ, and φ , all probabilistic knowledge bases KB, and all intervals [l, u] and φ ⇐ φ is valid, then KB ∼ (ψ|φ ) [l, u] .
It is not difficult to verify that logical entailment satisfies (L-INH), but not (P-INH), while g-coherent entailment satisfies neither (L-INH) nor (P-INH).
The basic idea behind the new probabilistic generalizations of Pearl's entailment in System Z and Lehmann's lexicographic entailment in this paper is to add to logical (resp., g-coherent) entailment (i) some inheritance of purely probabilistic (resp., logical and purely probabilistic) knowledge, where the inheritance of purely probabilistic knowledge depends on a strength λ ∈ [0, 1], and (ii) a mechanism for resolving inconsistencies due to the inheritance of logical and purely probabilistic knowledge.
The strength λ ∈ [0, 1] determines to which extent purely probabilistic knowledge is inherited from classes down to subclasses. In the extreme cases of λ = 0 and λ = 1, purely probabilistic knowledge is not inherited at all and completely inherited, respectively; see (Lukasiewicz 2002a and b, respectively) . Whereas, in the case of 0 < λ < 1, given the interval [l, u] for the property of a class, some interval [r, s] ⊇ [l, u] is inherited down to all subclasses, where the largeness of the interval [r, s] depends on the strength λ (roughly, the smaller is λ, the larger is [r, s]).
λ-Consistency
We now introduce the notion of λ-consistency for probabilistic knowledge bases. We first give some preparative definitions.
A probabilistic interpretation Pr λ-verifies (resp., λ-falsifies) a conditional constraint (ψ|φ) [l, u] iff Pr verifies (resp., falsifies) (ψ|φ) [l,u] and Pr(φ)≥λ. A set of conditional constraints P λ-tolerates a conditional constraint C under a set of logical constraints L iff L ∪ P has a model that λ-verifies C. We say P is under L in λ-conflict with C iff no model of L ∪ P λ-verifies C. A conditional constraint ranking σ on a probabilistic knowledge base KB = (L , P) is λ-admissible with KB iff every P ⊆ P that is under L in λ-conflict with some C ∈ P contains some C such that σ (C ) < σ (C).
We are now ready to define the notion of λ-consistency for probabilistic knowledge bases KB. We say KB is λ-consistent iff there exists a conditional constraint ranking σ on KB that is λ-admissible with KB.
The following theorem characterizes the λ-consistency of KB = (L , P) through the existence of an ordered partition of P.
We next give some other useful definitions. A probability ranking κ maps each probabilistic interpretation on I to a member of {0, 1, . . . } ∪ {∞} such that κ(Pr) = 0 for at least one interpretation Pr. We use the expression φ λ to abbreviate the probabilistic for-
System Z of Strength λ
We now define a generalization of Pearl's entailment in System Z (1990) of strength λ∈[0, 1] for λ-consistent probabilistic knowledge bases KB=(L , P). The new notion of entailment is linked to an ordered partition of P, a conditional constraint ranking z λ on KB, and a probability ranking κ z λ . The z λ -partition of KB is the unique ordered partition (P 0 , . . . , P k ) of P such that each P i , i ∈ {0, . . . , k}, is the set of all C ∈ k j=i P j that are λ-tolerated under L by k j=i P j . Observe that by Theorem 3.1, every λ-consistent probabilistic knowledge base KB has a z λ -partition. The following two examples show some z λ -partitions. We next define z λ and κ z λ . For every j ∈ {0, . . . , k}, each C ∈ P j is assigned the value j under z λ . The probability ranking κ z λ on all probabilistic interpretations Pr is then defined as follows:
The probability ranking κ z λ defines a preference relation on probabilistic interpretations as follows. For probabilistic interpretations Pr and Pr , we say Pr is z λ -preferable to Pr iff κ z λ (Pr) < κ z λ (Pr ) . A model Pr of a set of logical constraints and probabilistic formulas F is a z λ -minimal model of F iff no model of F is z λ -preferable to Pr.
We are now ready to define the notion of z λ -entailment as follows. [l, u] . We say that (ψ|φ) [l, u] [l, u] , iff l (resp., u) is the infimum (resp., supremum) of Pr(ψ|φ) subject to all z λ -minimal models Pr of L ∪ {φ λ}.
We now illustrate the notion of z λ -entailment through some examples. The following example shows that the notion of z λ -entailment realizes an inheritance of logical properties from classes to non-exceptional subclasses, and an inheritance of purely probabilistic properties from classes to non-exceptional subclasses, where the latter inheritance depends on the strength λ. EXAMPLE 3.4 Consider the probabilistic knowledge base KB of Example 3.2. Some tight intervals under z λ -entailment, where λ ∈ {0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 1}, are shown in Table I . In particular, the logical knowledge of having legs is inherited from the class of birds down to the class of eagles, independently from λ, while the purely probabilistic knowledge of being able to fly with a probability of at least 0.95 is also inherited, but this is controlled by λ.
However, z λ -entailment does not inherit properties from classes to subclasses that are exceptional relative to some other property (and thus, like its classical counterpart, shows the problem of inheritance blocking). EXAMPLE 3.5 Consider the probabilistic knowledge base KB of Example 2.1. Some tight intervals under z λ -entailment, where λ ∈ {0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 1}, are shown in Table II . In particular, for λ ≥ 0.2, the logical property of having legs is not inherited from the class of birds to its exceptional subclass of ostriches. Note that in the case of λ = 0, this logical property is inherited, since there is no inheritance of purely probabilistic knowledge, and thus no conflict between the abilities to fly of birds and penguins. Table I Tight intervals under z λ -and lex λ -entailment from KB in Example 3.2 
Lexicographic Entailment of Strength λ
We now define a generalization of Lehmann's lexicographic entailment (1995) of strength λ∈[0, 1] for λ-consistent probabilistic knowledge bases KB. We use the z λ -partition (P 0 , . . . , P k ) of KB = (L , P) to define a lexicographic preference relation on probabilistic interpretations as follows. For probabilistic interpretations Pr and Pr , we say Pr is lex λ -preferable to Pr iff some i ∈ {0, . . . , k} exists such that |{C∈P i |Pr | C}| > |{C∈P i | Pr | Table II Tight intervals under z λ -entailment from KB in Example 2.1 [l,u] , iff every lex λ -minimal model of L ∪ {φ λ} satisfies (ψ|φ) [l, u] . We say (ψ|φ) [l, u] is a tight lex λ -consequence of KB, denoted KB ∼ lex λ tight (ψ|φ) [l,u] , iff l (resp., u) is the infimum (resp., supremum) of Pr(ψ|φ) subject to all lex λ -minimal models Pr of L ∪ {φ λ}.
The following example shows that lex λ -entailment realizes an inheritance of properties, without showing the problem of inheritance blocking. EXAMPLE 3.6 Some tight intervals under lex λ -entailment from the probabilistic knowledge bases of Examples 3.2 and 2.1 are shown in Tables I and III, respectively. As shown in Table III , for all λ, having legs is inherited from the class of birds down to the exceptional subclass of ostriches. Table III Tight intervals under lex λ -entailment from KB in Example 2.1 In this section, we explore some properties of z λ -and lex λ -entailment. We first describe some general nonmonotonic properties. We then explore the relationship between the formalisms, and the one to their classical counterparts.
General Nonmonotonic Properties
We now analyze some general nonmonotonic properties of the new probabilistic entailment semantics introduced in this paper. We first consider the postulates Right Weakening (RW), Reflexivity (Ref), Left Logical Equivalence (LLE), Cut, Cautious Monotonicity (CM) , and Or proposed by Kraus et al. (1990) , which are commonly regarded as being particularly desirable for any reasonable notion of nonmonotonic entailment. The following result shows that z λ -and lex λ -entailment both satisfy (probabilistic versions of) these postulates. Here,
Rational Monotonicity (RM) (Kraus et al., 1990 ) is another desirable property. It expresses a restricted monotony and allows to ignore certain kinds of irrelevant knowledge. The next theorem shows that z λ -and lex λ -entailment both satisfy (a weak form of) RM. 
Relationship between Probabilistic Formalisms
We now explore the relationship between z λ -and lex λ -entailment. The following theorem shows that z λ -entailment is weaker that lex λ -entailment. Moreover, it shows that lex λ -entailment of (ψ|φ) [l, u] from KB = (L , P) is weaker than logical entailment of (ψ|φ) [l, u] from L ∪ P ∪ {φ λ}.
THEOREM 4.3 Let KB = (L , P) be a λ-consistent probabilistic knowledge base, and let (ψ|φ) [l, u] be a conditional constraint. Then,
In general, the converse implications do not hold, as follows from Examples 3.5 and 3.6 for λ = 1. But, in the special case when L ∪ P ∪{φ λ} is satisfiable, the notions of z λ -and lex λ -entailment of (ψ|φ) [l, u] from KB = (L , P) both coincide with the notion of logical entailment of (ψ|φ) [l, u] from L ∪ P ∪{φ λ}. This result is expressed by the following theorem.
THEOREM 4.4 Let KB = (L , P) be a λ-consistent probabilistic knowledge base, and let (ψ|φ) [l, u] be a conditional constraint such that L ∪ P ∪ {φ λ} is satisfiable. Then, (a) KB ∼ z λ (ψ|φ) [l, u] iff KB ∼ lex λ (ψ|φ) [l, u] . (b) KB ∼ lex λ (ψ|φ) [l, u] iff L ∪ P ∪ {φ λ} || (ψ|φ) [l, u] .
Relationship to Classical Formalisms
We now analyze the relationship between the new formalisms of this paper and their classical counterparts. We first give some technical preparation. The operator γ on conditional constraints, sets of conditional constraints, and probabilistic knowledge bases replaces each conditional constraint of the form (ψ|φ) [1, 1] by the classical default ψ ← φ. We use the expressions | ∼ z and | ∼ lex to denote the classical notions of Pearl's entailment in System Z and Lehmann's lexicographic entailment, respectively.
The following theorem shows that the new notions of z λ -and lex λ -entailment for λ-consistent probabilistic knowledge bases generalize their classical counterparts for ε-consistent conditional knowledge bases. 
SUMMARY AND OUTLOOK
We have presented the notions of z λ -and lex λ -entailment, which are probabilistic generalizations of Pearl's entailment in System Z and Lehmann's lexicographic entailment. They are parameterized through a value λ ∈ [0, 1] that describes the strength of the inheritance of purely probabilistic knowledge. In the special cases of λ = 0 and λ = 1, the new probabilistic formalisms coincide with the notions of z-and lex-entailment in (Lukasiewicz 2002a and b, respectively) . We have shown that z λ -and lex λ -entailment have similar properties as their classical counterparts. In particular, they both satisfy the rationality postulates of System P and the property of Rational Monotonicity. Moreover, z λ -entailment is weaker than lex λ -entailment, and both z λ -and lex λ -entailment have proper embeddings of their classical counterparts. An interesting topic of future research is to develop algorithms for the new probabilistic formalisms and to analyze their computational complexity, which can be done along the lines of (Lukasiewicz 2002a,b) .
Another exciting topic of future research is to develop and explore further nonmonotonic probabilistic logics. Besides extending other classical formalisms for default reasoning from conditional knowledge bases, one may also combine the new formalisms of this paper with some probability selection technique (as e.g. maximum entropy or center of mass).
